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1.	Introduction	
The	 poverty	 literature	 is	 fertile	 ground	 for	 controversies.	 Different	 ethical	 frameworks	 have	
produced	 distinct	 conceptualisations	 of	 poverty	 that	 on	 their	 turn	 have	 generated	 a	 wide	
range	of	often-conflicting	measurement	strategies	(Ravallion,	2016;	Anand	et	al,	2010).	From	
the	earlier	contemporary	debates	between	Townsend	(1979)	and	Sen	(1983)	about	relative	vs	
absolute	poverty	to	more	recent	arguments	generated	by	the	multi-dimensional	poverty	index	
(Alkire	and	Foster,	2011),	it	is	possible	to	find	a	rich	history	of	divergences	about	dimensions,	
variables	and	indicators	that	are	used	to	unveil	the	characteristics	of	the	poor.	And	yet,	despite	
all	 differences	 and	 controversies,	 it	 can	 be	 noted	 that	 all	 discordant	 approaches	 to	 poverty	
have	 a	 common	 foundation,	 namely,	 they	 all	 seem	 to	 follow	 Sen’s	 (1981)	 suggested	
identification	strategy	under	which	poverty	analysis	must	be	only	about	the	well-being	of	the	
poor.	The	so	called	‘focus	on	the	poor	axiom’	is	normally	considered	uncontroversial	(Duclos,	
2009).	Nevertheless,	it	invites	a	certain	kind	of	analysis	involving	a	‘narrow	focus	on	attributes’	
of	the	poor	that	has	dominated	poverty	studies	(Dasandi,	2014).	
This	does	not	mean	that	we	should	dispute	the	necessity	and	usefulness	of	this	identification	
exercise,	 whenever	 it	 proves	 valid.	 Rather,	 it	 argues	 that	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 broadened	 to	
encompass	the	impressions,	beliefs,	attitudes	and	actions	of	the	non-poor,	 in	particular	what	
Cortina	 (2017)	 defined	 as	 ‘aporophobia’,	 or	 simply,	 ‘rejection	 of	 the	 poor’.	 The	 argument	 is	
that	 the	 way	 that	 the	 non-poor	 imagine,	 understand	 and	 act	 towards	 the	 poor	 is	 part	 of	
poverty	 phenomena,	 independently	 of	 how	 one	 decides	 to	 conceptualise	 or	 measure	 it	
(Sherman,	 2001).	 This	 should	 not	 be	 confused	 with	 psychosocial	 implications	 of	 poverty	
(Ximenes	et	al,	2019)	nor	with	social	exclusion	(Pierson,	2016),	because	these	measures	both	
focus	on	the	suffering	of	the	poor.	On	the	other	hand,	aporophobia	focuses	on	what	the	non-
poor	 think	and	do	about	 the	poor.	Of	course,	who	 is	or	not	poor	will	depend	on	 the	chosen	
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references	(poverty	thresholds)	that	are	adopted.	It	 is	even	possible	that	those	who	are	poor	
may	reject	the	extremely	poor	(Narayan	et	al,	2000).	
The	need	for	examining	the	concept	of	aporophobia	can	be	 justified	on	three	main	grounds.	
First,	 it	 names	 a	 phenomenon	 that	 already	 exists	 and	 that	 has	 never	 been	 properly	
investigated.	 Secondly,	 it	 provides	 a	 ‘missing	 link’	 between	 poverty	 and	 inequality	 because	
aporophobia	 can	 connect	 and	 explain	 their	 underlying	 processes.	 Thirdly,	 it	 addresses	 ‘the	
other	 side	 of	 the	 coin’	 in	 the	 poverty	 debate	 because	 without	 the	 understanding	 and	
commitment	of	the	non-poor,	it	is	difficult	to	find	alternatives	for	the	reduction	of	the	hardest	
forms	of	multidimensional	and	chronic	poverty.	Or	even	worse,	because	when	the	non-poor’s	
beliefs	 about	 the	 poor	 involve	 misconceptions	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 their	 poverty,	 policy-
reduction	policies	tend	to	become	irrelevant	or	do	the	poor	more	harm	than	good	(Williamson,	
1976).	
Thus,	building	on	Cortina’s	(2017)	ground-breaking	work,	the	key	contribution	of	this	paper	is	
to	 offer	 the	 first	 analytical	 framework	 to	 tackle	 the	 multi-dimensions	 of	 aporophobia	 as	 a	
preliminary	step	towards	a	fully-fledged	theory	of	aporophobia.	More	specifically,	i)	it	provides	
a	 conceptual	 analysis	 of	 the	 aporophobia	 phenomena,	 suggesting	 that	 there	 are	 three	
dimensions	 of	 aporophobia,	 namely,	 macro,	 meso	 and	 micro	 aporophobia,	 ii)	 it	 introduces	
conceptual	and	measurement	models	 to	 increase	the	theoretical	density	of	 the	concept	 that	
add	corresponding	sub-dimensions	and	iii)	it	examines	preliminary	evidence	of	the	existence	of	
aporophobia	at	an	aggregate	level.	 In	doing	so,	 it	 introduces	a	new	measure	of	aporophobia,	
such	 as	 the	 Global	 Aporophobia	 Index.	 It	 concludes	 by	 putting	 forward	 a	 policy	 agenda	 for	
reducing	 poverty	 focused	 on	 the	 responsibilities	 and	 the	 role	 of	 the	 non-poor.	 The	 main	
message	of	this	paper	 is	clear:	the	non-poor	are	part	of	the	(poverty)	problem	and	therefore	
need	to	be	part	of	its	solution.	
	
2.	What	is	aporophobia?	
Aporophobia	is	a	neologism	originally	created	by	Cortina	(1995)	that	comes	from	the	union	of	
two	 Greek	 words,	 ‘aporos’	 (the	 poor)	 and	 ‘phobia’	 (rejection,	 fear,	 aversion).	 It	 refers	 to	 a	
range	 of	 situations	 and	 circumstances	 in	which	 the	 non-poor	 discriminate	 against	 the	 poor.	
Cortina	 (2017)	 has	 fully	 developed	 this	 concept.	 She	 used	 17	 different	 expressions	 to	
characterise	a	list	of	aporophobia	phenomena	(see	Table	1).	Three	features	of	this	rich	portrait	
should	 be	 noted:	 first,	 the	 various	 expressions	 used	 by	 Cortina	 seem	 to	 belong	 to	 different	
psychological	 categories	 (impressions,	 attitudes,	 beliefs	 and	 actions,	 as	 categorised	 by	
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Ekkekakis,	 2013));	 secondly,	 they	 appear	 to	 convey	 distinct	 levels	 of	 intensity.	 For	 instance,	
attitudes	such	as	‘disregard’	do	not	seem	to	be	as	intense	as	‘hate	acts’.	Thirdly,	they	represent	
forms	 of	 rejection	 grounded	 on	 asymmetric	 relations.	 It	 is	 interesting	 to	 observe	 that	
asymmetric	relations	per	se	would	not	be	enough	to	produce	aporophobia.	As	Roemer	(2000)	
has	 argued,	 there	 are	 forms	of	 inequality	 and	 asymmetric	 relations	 that	 are	 not	 intrinsically	
negative	 (for	 instance,	 if	 justified	 as	 outcomes	 of	 different	 levels	 of	 individual	 effort).	
Therefore,	 aporophobia	 depends	 on	 the	 existence	 of	 asymmetric	 relations	 that	 are	
characterised	by	a	 certain	corruption	of	our	moral	 sentiments,	 as	Smith	 (1976	 [1759])	would	
put	it.		
	
Table	1	–	List	of	expressions	associated	with	aporophobia	and	corresponding	categories	
Original	expression	in	Spanish	 Translation	into	English	 Categories	
Antipatía	 Antipathy	 Attitude	
Relación	asimétrica	 Asymmetric	relation	 Beliefs,	actions	
Aversión	 Aversion	 Beliefs,	attitude	
Desprecio	 Contempt	 Feelings/impressions,	
attitude	
Trato	vejatorio	 Degrading	treatment	 Actions	
Repugnancia	 Disgust	 Feelings/impressions,	
attitude	
Desatención	generalizada	 Disregard	 Action	
Temor,	Miedo	 Fear	 Imagination/feelings,	
attitude	
Odio	 Hate	 Imagination/feelings,	
attitude	
Incidentes	de	odio	 Hate	acts	 Actions	
Hate	speech	 Hate	speech	 Actions	
Hostilidad	 Hostility	 Attitude,	actions	
Insulto	 Insult	 Actions	
Impaciencia	 Impatience	 Attitude	
No	reconocimiento	recíproco	 No	 reciprocal	
acknowledgement	
Attitude,	actions	
Agresión	física	 Physical	aggression	 Actions	
Rechazo	 Rejection	 Attitude,	actions	
Source:	Authors’	elaboration	based	on	Cortina	(2017).	
	
The	 key	 issue	 for	 Cortina	 (2017)	 is	 the	 narrowness	 of	 a	 contractualist	 view	 of	 society	
(understood	as	a	 social	 contract	based	on	mutual	 advantage).	According	 to	 this	perspective,	
the	‘aporoi’	are	those	people	who	have	nothing	good	to	offer	to	society.	This	means	that	they	
cannot	 generate	 an	 expectation	 of	 reciprocation.	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	 non-poor	 do	 not	
recognise	them	(Honneth,	1995).	In	other	words,	for	the	non-poor	it	is	not	worth	entering	into	
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dialogue	 with	 the	 poor	 and	 consequently	 the	 poor	 does	 not	 deserve	 their	 respect.	 At	 one	
extreme,	 it	might	 induce	 ‘only’	 a	 certain	 lack	 of	 recognition	 (and	 a	 sense	 that	 the	 poor	 are	
recognised	as	concrete	creatures	of	need).	At	the	other	extreme,	it	might	produce	aggression	
and	hate	crimes.	 	 The	broader	picture	here	 is	a	vision	of	 society	based	on	a	narrow	 form	of	
social	contract	that	is	usually	justified	on	the	principle	of	mutual	advantage.	According	to	this	
view,	if	the	only	thing	that	the	poor	can	bring	to	the	non-poor	is	a	list	of	problems,	then	better	
to	ignore	or	reject	them.		
At	 the	 end,	 Cortina’s	 (2017)	 characterisation	 of	 aporophobia	 is	 a	 sharp	 critique	 of	 Rawlsian	
societies	 based	 on	 instrumental	 reciprocity,	 joining	 forces	 with	 Nussbaum	 (2006)	 who	 also	
criticised	 the	 principle	 of	 mutual	 advantage	 as	 a	 proper	 foundation	 for	 social	 cooperation.	
Esquembre	 (2019)	notes	 that	 the	 theme	of	 aporophobia	 can	be	understood	as	 a	 ‘normative	
disruption’	in	this	standard	(Rawlsian)	anthropology	of	reciprocity,	because	there	is	a	group	of	
people	that	do	not	have	any	possibility	of	reciprocation.		
For	 Cortina,	 aporophobia	 is	 at	 the	 root	 of	 several	 other	 kinds	 of	 discrimination,	 such	 as	
xenophobia,	 racism,	 religious	 and	 gender	 discrimination.	 In	 her	 view,	 not	 all	 foreigners	 are	
equally	 discriminated	 (e.g.	 tourists	 are	 always	welcomed)	 but	mainly	 those	poor	 immigrants	
and	 refugees.	 Similarly,	 the	 homeless	 are	 condemned	 to	 be	 insulted	 or	 (in	 the	 best	 case	
scenario)	 to	 become	 invisible	 to	 the	 non-poor	 (Hatento,	 2015).	 Not	 all	 people	 are	
discriminated	merely	 by	 their	 race	 and	 colour	 but	 again	mostly	 those	 that	 are	 for	 instance	
‘black	 and	 poor’.	 This	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 people	 who	 are	 not	 poor	 cannot	 be	 equally	
discriminated,	 but	 that	 often	 aporophobia	 goes	 hand-in-hand	 with	 other	 kinds	 of	
discrimination.	 In	 addition,	 we	 should	 mention	 the	 following	 features	 of	 aporophobia	 for	
Cortina	(2017):	
1. It	 is	 the	 rejection	 of	 a	 group,	 not	 of	 an	 individual.	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 is	 not	 the	
individuality	 of	 a	 poor	 person	 that	 raises	 the	 phobia	 but	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 an	
understanding	 by	 the	 non-poor	 that	 poor	 people	 belong	 to	 a	 group	 that	 should	 be	
avoided	or	rejected;	
2. It	is	not	a	phobia	based	on	an	identity	because	involuntary	poverty	is	not	part	of	one’s	
identity.	With	rare	exceptions,	people	do	not	choose	to	be	poor;	
3. All	human	beings	are	aporophobic	due	to	neural,	evolutionary	and	social	causes.	The	
non-poor	indulge	into	interpretations	of	their	superiority	because	this	sends	a	calming	
message	to	them;	
4. It	is	a	problem	of	moral	motivation	of	individuals;	
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5. It	is	a	daily	issue	that	manifests	itself	at	several	different	levels	(with	considerable	gaps	
between	speech	and	action);	
6. It	is	a	problem	that	also	affects	the	institutional	life	of	societies,	including	their	habits	
and	cultures	that	shape	their	inter-subjective	agreements;	
7. It	is	a	social	pathology.		
Altogether,	 these	 features	provide	an	alternative	narrative	 to	 the	mainstream	discourse	 that	
claims	that	the	poor	are	the	only	ones	responsible	for	their	poverty	(“if	they	are	lazy,	dirty	and	
do	not	wish	to	work,	they	are	their	own	cause	of	poverty	and	therefore	deserve	it”).	Instead,	
the	aporophobia	narrative	allows	us	to	consider	that	‘the	poverty	issue’	is	also	about	how	the	
media,	 the	 relevant	 institutions	and	 the	non-poor	 relate	 to	 the	poor	 (Garcia-Granero,	2017).	
There	is	a	link	between	fear	and	rejection	that	is	produced	by	alarmist	narratives.	Indeed,	it	is	
frequent	to	find	in	the	press	headlines	that	relate	the	poor	to	a	wide	range	of	social	problems	
that	 threaten	 the	 peace	 and	 stability	 of	 western	 societies	 (despite	 any	 corroborating	
systematic	evidence,	for	an	interesting	discussion	see	Bullock	et	al	(2001)	about	how	the	poor	
are	portrayed	on	TV).		
Martínez	 (2002)	 argues	 that	 mediatic	 phenomena	 might	 give	 rise	 to	 a	 ‘vicious	 circle	 of	
aporophobia’,	 that	 starts	 with	 the	 underprivileged	 groups	 being	 accused	 of	 crimes,	 such	 as	
stealing,	drug	dealing,	prostitution,	etc.	Later,	these	accounts	create	a	perception	that	makes	it	
much	harder	for	the	poor	to	be	integrated	into	society,	increasing	the	probability	that	some	of	
them	might	 consider	doing	an	 illegal	act,	 in	 such	a	way	 that	 the	original	 stereotype	ends	up	
being	 reinforced.	 Andrade	 (2008)	 remarks	 that	 the	 rejection	 of	 the	 poor	 per	 se	 is	 not	 a	
sociological	 novelty	 but	 that	 its	 use	 as	 a	 key	 analytical	 category	 for	 understanding	 the	
processes	 that	 generate	 poverty	 provides	 a	 refreshing	 perspective	 that	 might	 serve	 as	 a	
reminder	for	the	non-poor	about	their	responsibilities	towards	the	poor.	
One	 interesting	 development	 is	 that	 if	 poverty	 is	multidimensional,	 then	we	 can	 experience	
multidimensional	 ways	 in	which	 the	 poor	 can	 be	 rejected.	 In	 other	words,	 for	 each	 kind	 of	
poverty	we	should	expect	a	corresponding	kind	of	aporophobia.	In	fact,	Cortina	(2000)	argues	
that	 there	 are	multiple	 dimensions	 of	 aporophobia.	 Because	 a	 person	 can	 be	 deprived,	 for	
instance,	of	his	or	her	political	community,	security,	health,	social	protection	(unemployment	
benefit,	pensions),	education,	political	power,	etc.,	he	or	she	might	not	have	much	to	offer	and	
might	be	a	victim	of	aporophobia	in	diverse	ways.	Aporophobia	then	is	the	‘insult	to	injury’	to	
the	poor.	
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But	 how	 can	 we	 advance	 Cortina’s	 agenda	 towards	 a	 broader	 understanding	 of	 the	 multi-
dimensions	of	aporophobia?	One	of	the	difficulties	to	be	faced	is	that	aporophobia	is	described	
by	her	through	the	use	of	17	different	expressions	or	situations	that	need	to	be	harmonised	as	
part	 of	 a	 common	 framework	 to	 achieve	 a	 certain	 theoretical	 standing.	 Moreover,	
aporophobia	does	not	emerge	simply	out	of	a	social	vacuum	but	 it	 is	 influenced	by	objective	
conditions	 that	 shape	 the	 social	 environment	 of	 different	 societies	 such	 as	 their	 levels	 of	
poverty	 and	 inequality.	 It	 is	 important	 that	 we	 tackle	 not	 simply	 the	 micro	 dimensions	 of	
aporophobia	but	also	its	broader	dimensions.	
	
3.	Framing	Aporophobia	
Aporophobia	is	not	merely	an	individual	phenomenon.	Rather,	it	is	also	a	social	phenomenon.	
This	 means	 that	 aporophobia	 has	 at	 the	 very	 least	 a	 macro	 (systemic)	 as	 well	 as	 a	 micro	
(individual)	dimension.	If	it	is	true	that	non-poor	people	can	be	aporophobic,	it	should	also	be	
considered	 that	 governments	 can	 be	 aporophobic,	 for	 instance	 in	 their	 fiscal	 policy	 (WDR	
2004),	 given	 that	 the	non-poor	 can	 influence	 redistributive	politics	 (McCarty	 and	Pontusson,	
2011).	 Aporophobia	 can	 also	 be	 a	 feature	 of	 certain	 institutions	 that	 constitute	 a	 particular	
class	of	phenomena.			
Within	this	context,	a	complete	account	of	aporophobia	must	consider	it	as	a	multi-dimension	
phenomena	 that	 could	 include	 three	 distinct	 levels,	 namely:	 i)	 a	micro	 dimension,	 based	 on	
psychological	 features	 and	 actions	 of	 non-poor	 individuals;	 ii)	 a	meso	 dimension,	 whenever	
aporophobia	 is	 manifested	 as	 a	 result	 of	 particular	 institutions	 (for	 instance,	 schools	 and	
hospitals	can	have	aporophobic	cultures)	and	iii)	a	macro	dimension,	based	on	factors,	such	as	
the	non-poor’s	 power	 to	 appropriate	 a	 considerable	 share	of	 national	 income	and	 influence	
the	distributive	role	of	governments.		
Each	 dimension	 corresponds	 to	 specific	 processes	 that	 can	 be	 considered	 in	 isolation	 for	
analytical	 purposes	 only.	 These	 processes	 will	 be	 described	 in	 detail	 in	 the	 following	
subsections.	 We	 can	 name	 them	 according	 to	 Figure	 1	 that	 suggests	 a	 general	 conceptual	
model	for	aporophobia:	
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Figure	1	–	Main	aporophobic	dimensions	and	processes	
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Source:	Authors’	creation.	
	
3.1	Micro	dimension		
Micro	 aporophobic	 processes	 can	 be	 represented	 by	 those	 psychological-emotional	
trajectories	that	explain	how	individuals	grow	into	being	aporophobic	in	different	ways	and	to	
different	degrees.	They	 involve	responses,	not	always	fully	coordinated,	between	 individuals’	
information-processing	cognitive	skills,	neurophysiological	reactions,	expressions	and	emotion	
sensitivities	and	executive	functions	that	prepare	individuals	to	act	(Scherer,	2005).	What	can	
be	 named	 I
3
BA
2
C-processes	 (or	 IBAC,	 for	 short)	 represents	 a	 static	 linear	 process	 in	 which	
individuals	 compose	 their	 impressions,	 interpretations	 and	 imaginations	 (I
3
)	 of	 the	 ‘stories’	
about	the	poor	that	-when	consolidated-	inform	their	beliefs	about	them.	On	their	turn,	beliefs	
(B)	may	influence	individuals’	attitudes	and	actions	(A
2
).	Some	of	them	might	result	 in	crimes	
(C).		
Of	 course,	 processes	 need	 time	 to	 develop	 and	 with	 the	 analytical	 inclusion	 of	 time,	 these	
static	 linear	 processes	 become	 full	 trajectories	 that	 might	 produce	 or	 not	 feedback	 loops.	
Indeed,	 aporophobia	 might	 start	 very	 early	 in	 life	 when	 children	 start	 forming	 their	 early	
perceptions	of	different	traits	between	the	rich	and	the	poor.	These	are	processes,	well-known	
in	 the	 literature	 (e.g.	 Sigelman,	 2012)	 but	 so	 far	 not	 fully	 characterised	 as	 aporophobic.	 By	
articulating	them	in	a	single	framework	we	allow	a	full	understanding	of	their	overall	impact.	In	
what	 follows,	 Figure	 2	 provides	 a	 simple	 illustration	 of	 IBAC	 static	 processes,	 for	 analytical	
purposes.	
	
	
I
3
BA
2
C-processes	
h-processes	
i-processes	
g-processes	
e-processes	
meso	
macro	
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Figure	2	–	I
3
BA
2
C	static	processes	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Source:	Authors’	creation.	
Source:	Authors’	creation.	
	
The	 categories	 of	 impressions,	 interpretations	 and	 imaginations	 combine	 cognitive	 and	non-
cognitive	 (psychological-sociological-emotional)	 elements	 (Damasio,	 2006).	 Altogether,	 they	
inform	 beliefs	 that	 can	 naturally	 reinforce	 a	 new	 round	 of	 impressions,	 interpretations	 and	
imaginations.	 But	 they	 are	 far	 from	 being	 able	 to	 avoid	 cognitive	 and	 non-cognitive	
shortcomings	 and	 for	 this	 reason	 we	 need	 to	 consider	 what	 we	 have	 named	 h-processes	
where	 ‘h’	 stands	 for	 ‘heuristics’.	 In	 real	 life,	people	make	mistakes	and	their	 judgements	are	
often	biased	because	they	are	informed	by	a	wide	variety	of	heuristics.		
Kahneman	 (2012)	 offers	 a	 systematic	 account	 of	 several	 kinds	 of	 heuristics	 (named	here	 ‘h-
processes’),	based	on	Stanovich	and	West’s	(2000)	terminology	of	System	1	(S1)	and	System	2	
(S2)	to	describe	the	cognitive	ease	with	which	 individuals	process	 information	(S1)	compared	
to	 their	 more	 articulated	 judgments	 (S2).	 The	 interesting	 point	 is	 that	 it	 seems	 that	
aporophobia	is	shaped	largely	by	the	workings	of	S1.	It	is	within	S1	that	we	find	a	‘model	of	the	
world’	that	individuals	use	to	evaluate	events	as	normal	or	surprising;	it	is	S1	the	source	of	our	
intuitive	 judgments.	 The	main	 objective	 of	 S1	 is	 to	 provide	 coherent	 stories	 so	 that	we	 can	
decide	how	to	act	in	the	world.	S1	extrapolates,	generalises,	detects	simple	relations	(e.g.	“all	
poor	are	alike”).		
As	such,	S1	is	biased	to	believe	and	confirm	the	things	that	we	already	know	rather	than	learn	
about	 new	 evidence.	 S1	 feeds	 on	 stereotypes	 and	 it	 is	 designed	 to	 jump	 to	 conclusions.	 As	
Kahneman	(2012:	209)	puts	it,	“The	amount	of	evidence	and	its	quality	do	not	count	for	much,	
because	poor	evidence	can	make	a	very	good	story.	For	some	of	our	most	important	beliefs	we	
have	 no	 evidence	 at	 all,	 except	 that	 people	we	 love	 and	 trust	 hold	 these	 beliefs”.	 To	make	
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things	 worse,	 there	 is	 evidence	 that	 suggests	 that	 our	 brains	 are	 more	 influenced	 by	 bad	
events	than	by	good	events	(Baumeister	et	al,	2001).		
This	means	 that	 emotionally	 loaded	words	normally	 used	 to	describe	 the	poor	 attract	more	
attention	 than	 positive	words	 that	 can	 produce	 a	 feeling	 of	 happiness.	 Even	without	 a	 real	
threat,	the	mere	mention	of	a	possibility	of	threat	can	be	understood	by	S1	as	a	real	threat.	An	
application	of	 some	of	 these	heuristics	 to	 aporophobia	 (see	 Table	 2)	 illustrate	how	 complex	
some	of	these	processes	can	be.	
	
Table	2	–Illustrations	of	heuristics	applied	to	aporophobia	
Heuristic	 Aporophobia	situations	
Substitution	 heuristics:	 when	 faced	 with	 a	
difficult	 question,	 instead	 of	 trying	 to	 answer	 it	
individuals	answer	a	different,	but	easier	one	
The	non-poor	prefer	 to	 ask	questions	 about	 the	
harm	 that	 refugees	 can	 cause	 to	 their	 societies	
rather	 than	 consider	 the	 complex	 causes	 that	
explain	why	they	left	their	places	of	origin	
Associative	 activation	 heuristics:	 simple	
conjunction	 of	 two	 words	 establishes	 an	
association	of	ideas	
When	the	non-poor	watch	news	about	 the	poor	
and	 bad	 events,	 they	 might	 subsequently	
associate	 the	 poor	with	 negative	memories	 and	
negative	emotions	
Priming	 and	 reciprocal-priming	 heuristics:	 some	
words,	 actions	 or	 emotions	 that	 came	 first	 to	
mind	 shape	 individuals’	 interpretation	 of	 future	
events	 (without	 them	 being	 conscious	 about	
them)	
Because	the	non-poor	are	primed	about	negative	
features	 of	 the	 poor,	 they	 will	 express	
aporophobic	 thoughts	 that	 might	 lead	 them	
towards	 aporophobic	 actions	 that	 might	
reinforce	their	original	information	
Familiarity	 heuristics:	 the	 impression	 of	
familiarity	 gives	 individuals	 an	 impression	 of	
truth;	repetition	induces	cognitive	easing	
For	 the	 non-poor,	 information	 about	 the	 poor	
are	often	scarce	or	 inaccurate.	Because	they	are	
unfamiliar	 to	 the	 poor’s	 world,	 there	 is	 no	
cognitive	easying	about	them		
Confirmation	heuristics:	people	seek	information	
that	are	compatible	with	their	beliefs	
The	 non-poor	 search	 ex-post	 for	 arguments	 to	
confirm	 their	 previously-held	 beliefs	 about	 the	
poor	
Halo	heuristics:	individuals	tend	to	like	(or	dislike)	
everything	about	things	or	a	person	
Because	 the	 non-poor	 dislike	 something	 about	
the	 poor,	 they	 tend	 to	 attribute	 other	 negative	
things	 to	 the	poor	 that	 go	 altogether	 (“they	 are	
poor,	lazy	and	dangerous”)	
Affect	 heuristics:	 individuals’	 likes	 and	 dislikes	
determine	their	beliefs	about	the	world	
The	non-poor’s	 emotional	 attitudes	 towards	 the	
poor	 drive	 their	 beliefs;	 thus	 some	 legitimate	
arguments	about	the	poor	are	totally	ignored	
Stereotyping	 heuristics:	 the	 costs	 of	 paying	
attention	to	individual	realities	might	be	high,	so	
individuals	 build	 their	 reasoning	 around	
stereotypes	 (that	 are	 easier	 to	 fit	 into	 a	 causal	
story)	
The	 non-poor	 think	 about	 the	 poor	 based	 on	
stereotypes	 that	 are	 suggested	 to	 them	 by	 the	
media	
Possibility	 heuristics:	 individuals	 pay	 more	
attention	 to	 elements	 that	 they	 (emotionally)	
worry	about	
The	 non-poor’s	 worries	 spark	 in	 their	 minds	 a	
vivid	 image	 of	 threats	 by	 the	 poor.	 They	 react	
with	 more	 focus	 against	 the	 poor,	 even	
considering	 that	 objectively	 the	 probability	 of	
such	a	threat	is	low	
Source:	Author’s	creation.	
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It	is	important	to	note	that	a	heuristic	is	not	something	bad	per	se.	It	is	only	a	simple	procedure	
or	approach	that	is	used	by	individuals	to	handle	difficult	situations	by	appealing	to	imperfect	
but	adequate	 solutions.	The	problem	 is	 that	as	much	as	heuristics	 can	be	useful	 in	our	daily	
lives,	they	can	bias	our	normative	judgments.	As	a	result,	the	non-poor	end	up	with	a	view	of	
the	world	about	the	poor	that	it	is	much	simpler	and	more	perverse	(but	–paradoxically-	more	
coherent	 in	 their	 minds)	 than	 facts	 and	 data	 can	 justify,	 leading	 to	 a	 ‘blaming-the-victim’	
morality	 that	 justifies	 the	disenfranchisement	of	 the	poor	 from	human	development	 (Chafel,	
1997).	
Together,	IBAC	and	h-processes	produce	complex	patterns	of	individual	aporophobia.	They	are	
responsible	 not	 only	 by	 the	 valence	 of	 aporophobia	 but	 also	 by	 its	 activation	 and	 intensity	
(these	 terms	will	 be	 explained	 in	what	 follows).	 They	 offer	 a	much	more	 detailed	model	 of	
formation	of	beliefs	and	their	 impacts	on	attitudes	and	actions	than	for	 instance	the	general	
models	directly	derived	 from	 the	World	Values	Survey	 that	 try	 to	explain	political	 views	and	
behaviour	based	directly	on	the	category	of	beliefs	(e.g.	Alesina	and	Glaeser,	2004).	
	
3.2	Meso	dimension	
In	real	life,	these	IBAC	processes	and	their	corresponding	heuristics	are	embedded	within	meso	
and	macro	realities	 (as	described	by	Figure	1).	There	 is	 relevant	 literature	about	how	certain	
institutions,	 such	 as	 schools	 or	 hospitals	 (meso	 category),	 can	 also	 reject	 the	 poor	 in	 their	
activities	 (Hart,	 1971;	Watt,	 2002	 and	Mercer	 et	 al,	 2012,	 to	mention	 just	 a	 few).	 Teachers	
might	 dedicate	 less	 attention	 to	 their	 poorest	 students,	 doctors	 might	 try	 less	 expensive	
procedures	 with	 poorer	 patients,	 judges	 can	 systematically	 deliberate	 against	 the	 poor	
plaintiffs,	 local	 government	officials	 (in	 their	 daily	 affairs)	 can	 ignore	 the	urgent	demands	of	
the	poor	whereas	can	be	accountable	to	medium	class	claims.	Aporophobia	is	not	simply	about	
individual	beliefs	and	actions	against	the	poor	but	also	about	collective	and	institutional	biases	
against	them.	In	concrete	terms,	‘institutional	or	meso’	aporophobia	is	about	public	or	private	
institutions	(formal	or	informal)	rejecting	the	poor	(i-processes).	
It	 is	 true	 that	 in	 practice	 it	might	 be	difficult	 to	 explain	 and	disentangle	 an	 aporophobic	 act	
from	 an	 individual	 motivation	 or	 as	 an	 outcome	 of	 certain	 institutional	 features.	 It	 is	 most	
likely	that	such	acts	will	result	from	a	combination	of	factors,	such	as	formal	rules,	institutional	
norms,	 local	 cultures,	 among	 others	 and	 it	 does	 not	 seem	 much	 productive	 to	 try	 to	
analytically	 separate	 the	 influence	 of	 these	 factors	 when	 they	 in	 fact	 are	 jointly	 produced.	
Instead,	a	more	interesting	and	productive	procedure	seems	to	be	the	identification	of	formal	
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and	informal	institutional	features,	protocols,	norms	and	biases	against	the	poor.	Sometimes,	
equality	would	entail	different	protocols	for	different	groups,	for	instance,	to	take	into	account	
the	fact	that	the	poor	might	have	more	difficulty	to	understand	certain	explanations	from	their	
doctors	and	might	need	more	attention	from	them	(as	discussed	by	Hart	in	his	famous	‘inverse	
care	law’	of	1971).	Institutions’	rules	and	laws	can	create	mechanisms	that	shape	individuals’	
understanding	and	actions	towards	the	other	(Ahn	and	Ostrom,	2008).	
	
3.3	Macro	dimension	
At	 a	 higher	 level,	 there	 are	 processes	 that	 can	 be	 grouped	 under	 the	 title	 of	 macro	
aporophobia.	 They	 take	 place	 when	 economic	 structures	 (that	 can	 be	 named	 e-processes)	
and/or	 government	 policies	 (called	 g-processes)	 reject	 the	 poor	 in	 the	 social	 struggle	 for	
defining	 the	 distribution	 of	 resources	 in	 society.	 Our	 main	 argument	 here	 is	 that	 in	
aporophobic	 societies	 the	 rich	 have	 a	 higher	 capacity	 to	 appropriate	 a	 larger	 share	 of	 their	
gross	 economic	 product.	 This	 is	 substantiated	 by	 Palma’s	 2016	 findings.	 These	 societies	
produce	 social	 organisms,	 market	 structures	 and	 economic	 ideologies	 that	 boost	 the	 non-
poor’s	 (in	 particular	 the	 rich’s)	 achievements	 (Piketty,	 2014).	 The	 main	 outcome	 of	 the	
interaction	 of	 these	 complex	 factors	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 proportion	 of	 the	 national	 income	
appropriated	 by	 the	 1%	 or	 10%	 richest.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 dismiss	 individual	 merits	 but	 to	
acknowledge	that	there	are	societies	in	which	their	economic	processes	are	more	conducive	to	
higher	 levels	 of	 income	 and	 wealth	 concentration	 and	 polarisation.	 In	 the	 pro-poor	
measurement	 debate	 not	much	 attention	 is	 given	 to	 the	 role	 of	 the	 non-poor	 in	 explaining	
different	distributive	patterns	(Kakwani	and	Pernia,	2000).	
One	 could	 however	 mention	 that	 there	 are	 societies	 in	 which	 their	 non-poor	 are	 very	
generous,	 actively	 sharing	 the	 fruits	 of	 their	 endeavours	with	 the	poor.	 For	 this	 reason,	 it	 is	
relevant	 to	 take	 into	 account	 how	 different	 e-processes	 can	 socially	 impact	 on	 the	 poor	
through	 ‘giving’	 of	 the	 non-poor.	 The	 fact	 that	 some	 e-process	 reject	 the	 poor	 do	 not	
constitute	the	ultimate	evidence	of	how	the	economy	as	a	whole	condemn	them	if	one	does	
not	take	into	account	private	redistribution	processes.		
One	might	 think	however	 that	governments	exist	 to	 fix	 this	problem	(Stiglitz	and	Rosengard,	
2015)	but	in	fact	governments	are	often	themselves	aporophobic	when	their	(regressive)	taxes	
represent	more	of	a	burden	to	the	poor	than	to	the	non-poor	and	when	their	services	benefit	
the	non-poor	 relatively	more	 than	 the	poor.	 So,	governments	 that,	 instead	of	 correcting	 the	
excesses	 of	 primary	 income	distribution	 and	 lack	 of	 private	 giving	 (charity)	 of	 the	non-poor,	
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actually	magnify	this	problem	with	regressing	taxes	and	public	spending	can	also	be	considered	
aporophobic	(g-processes).	In	the	global	history	of	social	spending	in	the	past	three	centuries,	
there	is	a	noticeable	trend	to	find	lower	levels	of	redistribution	from	the	rich	to	the	poor	when	
and	where	they	are	most	needed,	what	has	been	named	by	Lindert	 (2004),	 ‘the	Robin	Hood	
paradox’.	Thus,	in	countries	with	higher	income	inequality	and	higher	poverty,	where	the	poor	
could	benefit	most	from	progressive	interventions,	is	precisely	when	they	are	not	present	due	
to	the	underlying	political	forces.	The	imbalance	of	earning-power	endowments	between	the	
poor	and	the	non-poor	that	is	characterised	by	e-processes	is	thus	transmitted	to	g-processes.		
Even	when	governments	try	to	 introduce	pro-poor	policies	such	as	Conditional	Cash	Transfer	
programs	 (CCTs),	 they	might	 face	difficulties	 in	 implementing	 these	 interventions	because	of	
the	negative	criticism	of	the	public	opinion	(of	the	non-poor).	There	is	an	interesting	literature	
on	‘the	political	economy	of	inequality’	that	shows	how	economic	and	social	inequalities	affect	
politics	and	government	redistributive	policies	 (McCarty	and	Pontusson,	2011).	 It	 seems	that	
most	 mechanisms	 of	 governments’	 redistribution	 depend	 on	 the	 ability	 of	 ‘the	 organised	
poor’,	 also	 called	 ‘labour	market	 insiders’	 (e.g.	 those	 gathered	 in	 unions	 and	 left	 parties)	 to	
politically	convey	their	demands.	This	might	leave	behind	the	poorest	of	the	poor,	those	who	
might	be	involuntarily	rejected	by	the	other	poor.	
E-processes	and	g-processes	are	surely	not	blinded	to	distinct	levels	of	poverty	and	inequality	
faced	by	different	societies.	Societies	with	a	high	inequality	environment	do	experiment	higher	
social	distance	among	 the	non-poor	and	 the	poor,	what	might	be	conducive	 to	 stratification	
(Bottero,	2005),	and	that	on	its	turn	promotes	more	stereotypes	and	aporophobia.	But	often,	
what	matters	most	is	not	the	real	concrete	inequality	conditions	but	the	beliefs	or	ideologies	
that	 the	 non-poor	 develop	 about	 them.	 Alesina	 and	 Glaeser	 (2004)	 show	 how	 different	
European	and	American	images	about	the	poor	cannot	be	explained	by	their	objectively	small	
historical	differences.	As	 a	 result,	 the	European	view	 that	 the	poor	are	 trapped	and	unlucky	
and	 the	American	 view	 that	 the	poor	 are	 lazy	 and	unworthy	 seem	 to	be	explained	more	by	
political	ideologies.		
Do	 underlying	 economic	 realities,	 such	 as	 the	 level	 of	 poverty	 and	 inequality,	 influence	
aporophobia?	Or	 is	aporophobia	a	result	of	political	 ideologies	and	indoctrination?	These	are	
issues	 to	 be	 empirically	 examined	 because	 they	 can	 have	 different	 answers	 for	 different	
countries.	 In	what	 follows,	we	explore	 the	macro	aporophobia-poverty-inequality	hypothesis	
according	to	which	there	are	joint	impacts	of	poverty	and	inequality	over	e-	and	g-processes.	
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Thus,	whenever	poverty	and	inequality	are	high,	there	is	fertile	ground	for	the	flourishing	of	all	
kinds	of	aporophobia	behaviour.		
Combining	 all	 these	 influences,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 suggest	 the	 existence	 of	 an	 Aporophobia-
Poverty-Inequality	triangle,	as	illustrated	by	Figure	3.	
	
Figure	3	–	The	macro	Aporophobia-Poverty-Inequality	Triangle	
	
		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Source:	Authors’	creation.	
	
This	 triangle	 greatly	 simplifies	 the	 linkages	 between	 these	 processes	 but	 allows	 us	 to	 think	
about	the	main	implications	of	their	interactions.	Moreover,	it	puts	at	the	centre-stage	of	this	
discussion	the	non-poor	(or	if	one	wishes	to	be	more	analytically	ambitious,	‘the	rich’)	as	a	key	
category	 for	 understanding	 the	 persistence	 of	 poverty	 and	 inequality	 dynamics	 in	 all	 three	
levels	mentioned	above.	 In	 this	 scenario,	 governments	have	 an	 important	normative	 role	 as	
political	expressions	of	the	views	and	voice	of	the	non-poor	and	implementers	of	social	policy	
and	welfare	reforms	(Cozzarelli	et	al,	2001).		
The	 main	 hypothesis	 raised	 by	 this	 triangle	 is	 that	 poverty	 and	 inequality	 fuel	 macro	
aporophobia	 (understood	here	as	e-processes	and	g-processes),	 that	on	their	 turn	reinforces	
the	 mechanisms	 that	 produce	 further	 poverty	 and	 inequality.	 There	 is	 no	 assumption	 of	
causality	 per	 se	 here	 because	 ultimately	 there	 is	 a	 micro	 dimension	 of	 analysis	 that	 seems	
more	determining	for	explaining	the	processes	of	 individual	aporophobia.	We	are	aware	that	
this	suggestion	for	framing	aporophobia,	based	on	the	general	scheme	put	forward	in	Figure	1,	
raises	 all	 kinds	 of	 conceptual,	 theoretical,	measurement	 and	 empirical	matters,	 including	 its	
practical	 implications	 for	 policy-making.	 All	 these	 issues	 are	 however	 too	 complex	 to	 try	 to	
Poverty	 Inequality	
	
Macro	Aporophobia	
	(e	and	g	processes)	
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solve	in	a	single	paper.	For	this	reason,	instead	of	tackling	all	of	them	at	once,	we	decided	to	
focus	 on	 a	 theoretical	 question	 that	 is	 key	 for	 assessing	 the	 possibilities	 of	 measuring	
aporophobia,	namely,	whether	 it	 is	possible	 to	 structure	 the	17	expressions	used	by	Cortina	
(2017)	to	characterise	aporophobia	under	a	single	framework.	
	
4.	Measuring	aporophobia:	multi-dimensional	illustrations	
The	 aporophobia	 research	 agenda	 is	 disruptive;	 it	 provides	 new	 lenses	 to	 redefine	 how	
traditional	 phenomena,	 such	 as	 poverty	 and	 inequality,	 can	 be	 understood	 and	 measured.	
Cortina’s	 (2017)	theory,	centred	on	ethics	and	 individuals’	decision-making	processes,	can	be	
cleared	 used	 to	 characterise	 and	 measure	 the	 micro	 dimension	 of	 aporophobia.	 There	 is	 a	
natural	 synergy	 to	 be	 explored	 between	 ethics	 and	 psychology	 in	 developing	 micro	
aporophobia	measurement	 tools	 here.	 However,	when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	macro	 dimension	 of	
aporophobia,	we	have	 to	expand	her	 framework	 to	dialogue	with	a	 literature	on	beliefs	and	
political	 economy,	 as	 described	 earlier.	 	 To	 demonstrate	 the	 conceptual	 and	 empirical	
potential	of	aporophobia	as	an	organising	and	structuring	concept	for	measurement,	we	offer	
here	two	illustrations:	first,	a	micro	illustration,	focusing	on	the	development	of	a	conceptual	
measurement	framework	and	secondly,	a	macro	illustration,	centred	on	the	creation	of	a	new	
indicator	for	empirical	research.	
	
4.1	A	micro	dimension	conceptual	illustration	
A	question	of	central	 importance	 in	measuring	constructs	with	affective	components,	as	 it	 is	
the	 case	 of	 aporophobia,	 is	 to	 evaluate	whether	 its	 elements	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 distinct	
entities	 or	 whether	 they	 can	 be	 positioned	 along	 dimensions.	 To	 consider	 them	 as	 distinct	
entities,	would	mean	 that	 people	 can	 be	 simultaneously	 classified	 as	 aporophobic	 and	 non-
aporophobic	(in	the	analogy	of	being	happy	and	sad	at	the	same	time	for	different	aspects	of	a	
particular	 situation).	 It	 is	difficult	 to	 see	how	 this	 could	apply	 to	aporophobia.	However,	 the	
truth	 of	 the	 matter	 is	 that	 there	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 exist	 a	 single	 answer	 to	 this	 question.	
Following	Ekkekakis	(2013),	the	17	expressions	used	by	Cortina	(2017)	are	categorised	here	as	
17	 kinds	 of	 aporophobia	 that	 are	 represented	by	 their	 categories	 (as	 portrayed	by	 the	 IBAC	
model)	 conceived	 as	 combinations	 of	 two	 basic	 ingredients	 in	 different	 degrees.	 There	 is	
undoubtedly	 more	 in	 the	 richness	 and	 diversity	 of	 aporophobia	 than	 these	 two	 basic	
ingredients	might	suggest,	but	they	appear	to	be	foundational	towards	a	more	systemic	view	
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of	aporophobia.	In	other	words,	this	dimensional	approach	might	not	capture	the	totality	of	all	
content	domains	involved	in	aporophobia	phenomena,	but	it	seems	that	they	can	capture	key	
aspects	of	this	construct.	Thus,	the	main	dimensions	operating	mostly	at	a	micro	 level	would	
be:	
a) Valence:	an	evaluative	factor,	registering	how	positive	or	negative	or	good	or	bad	is	a	
central	construct;	
b) Activation:	 an	 activity	 factor,	 showing	whether	 a	 construct	 is	 fast	 or	 slow,	 active	 or	
passive.	
In	order	to	make	sense	of	the	valence	factor	for	aporophobia	it	is	important	to	introduce	the	
term	 ‘aporophilia’	 (the	 opposite	 of	 aporophobia).	 This	 is	 necessary	 for	 balancing	 the	
measurement	in	relation	to	the	valence	of	the	construct.	By	doing	so,	respondents	can	have	an	
equal	chance	to	report	that	they	have	experienced	one	of	these	states,	protecting	the	whole	
assessment	from	bias.	This	means	that	each	kind	of	aporophobia	should	have	a	corresponding	
bipolar	opposite	in	terms	of	aporophilia	(table	3).		
Table	3	–	Kinds	of	aporophobia	and	aporophilia	
Kinds	of	aporophobia	 Kinds	of	aporophilia	
Antipathy	 Sympathy	
Asymmetric	relation	 Symmetric	relation	
Aversion	 Fondness	
Contempt/despised	 Deference	
Degrading	treatment	 Honouring	
Disgust	 Attraction	
Disregard	 Consideration	
Fear	 Confidence/fearlessness	
Hate	 Love	
Hate	acts	 Love	acts	
Hate	speech	 Love	speech	
Hostility	 Kindness	
Insult	 Praise	
Impatience	 Patience	
No	reciprocal	acknowledgement	 Recognition	
Physical	aggression	 Physical	security/protection	
Rejection	 Acceptance	
	
Source:	Authors’	creation.	
	
Once	these	opposites	are	defined,	 it	 is	possible	 to	present	 them	 in	a	model,	 that	 for	sake	of	
simplicity	 could	 be	 named	 the	 3A	 measurement	 model	 of	 aporophobia,	 after	 their	 initials	
(‘A’porophobia,	 ‘A’porophilia	and	 ‘A’ctivation),	as	displayed	 in	Figure	4.	The	main	purpose	of	
16	
	
this	model	 is	 to	map	 out	 the	 informational	 spaces	 related	 to	 aporophobia	 (on	 impressions,	
interpretations	 and	 imaginations;	 beliefs;	 attitudes	 and	 actions).	 It	 is	 within	 these	
informational	spaces	that	all	different	spaces	of	aporophobia	discussed	by	Cortina	(2017)	can	
be	found.	But	what	do	they	mean?	In	very	general	terms	it	can	be	argued	that:	
i) impressions,	 interpretations	 and	 imaginations:	 if	 restricted	 to	 what	 they	 mean	
(without	becoming	beliefs,	attitudes	or	actions),	they	represent	a	low	activation	of	
kinds	 of	 aporophobia	 that	 have	 a	 lower	 valence.	 We	 are	 talking	 about	 early	
negative	ideas	about	the	poor	or	instinctive	reactions	such	as	contempt,	disgust	or	
fear	of	the	poor.	They	are	normally	the	inputs	for	individuals’	motivational	systems	
and	as	such	 they	 represent	a	merge	between	cognitive	and	affective	 ideas.	Non-
poor	 individuals	might	be	lead	to	feel,	understand	or	conjecture	through	their	S1	
certain	things	about	 the	poor	but	 that	are	not	validated	by	their	S2.	As	such	this	
informational	space	can	be	described	by	lower	valence	and	lower	activation;	
ii) beliefs:	 they	 might	 represent	 a	 higher	 level	 of	 valence	 and	 activation	 in	
comparison	to	the	previous	informational	space,	once	they	consist	of	impressions,	
interpretations	and	imaginations	accepted	by	individuals’	S2	system.	If	after	some	
effortful	mental	activity	the	individual	is	still	aporophobic	and	earlier	impressions,	
interpretations	and	imaginations	are	endorsed	rather	than	changed,	then	there	is	
a	 higher	 probability	 that	 they	 can	 be	 turned	 into	 attitudes	 and	 actions.	 This	
happens	when	beliefs	about	 the	poor	can	generate	 simple	causal	 theories	about	
how	 they	are	and	what	 they	want,	establishing	beliefs	of	 superiority	of	 the	non-
poor,	asymmetric	relation,	together	with	more	elaborated	thoughts	of	aversion;	
iii) attitudes:	they	consist	in	a	predisposition	to	act	that	not	always	are	translated	into	
behaviour	 or	 actions,	 but	 represent	 a	 higher	 activation	 that	 often	 emerges		
associated	with	higher	valences	of	aporophobia.	Here,	 impatience	with	the	poor,	
or	 attitudes	 of	 antipathy	 and	 rejection	 are	 representative	 of	 these	 tendencies.	
However,	 it	 is	 logically	 possible	 that	 some	 kinds	 of	 aporophobia	 belong	 to	more	
than	 one	 of	 these	 informational	 spaces.	 Thus,	 feelings	 of	 contempt	 can	 be	
translated	into	attitudes	of	contempt;	ideas	of	fear	can	be	translated	into	attitudes	
of	 fear,	and	so	on.	Even	when	the	valence	 is	 the	same,	 it	happens	 that	attitudes	
have	a	higher	activation	in	relation	to	beliefs;	
iv) actions:	they	are	often	an	outcome	of	individuals’	executive	functions	and	offer	an	
extra	 filter	 (after	 the	 cognitive	 and	 emotional	 filters	 of	 S2)	 for	 the	 non-poor.	
However,	it	is	expected	that	attitudes	will	be	translated	into	actions.	This	is	when	
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we	see	aporophobia	becoming	degrading	treatment,	disregard,	hate	acts,	hostility,	
insults	 and	 even	 physical	 aggression.	 At	 the	 extreme,	 aporophobia	 can	 become	
crimes	such	as	hate	speech	and	acts	and	full	physical	aggression.	
It	 is	 assumed	 here,	 following	 the	 IBAC	 model,	 that	 early	 impressions,	 imaginations	 and	
interpretations	will	feed	individuals’	belief	systems	that	on	their	turn	will	provide	motivational	
grounds	for	people’s	attitudes	and	actions.	This	scheme,	as	previously	portrayed	by	Figure	2,	is	
naturally	an	analytical	simplification	of	processes	that	are	also	shaped	by	particular	life	events	
and	social-historical	events.	As	such,	it	is	in	itself	a	heuristic	for	understanding	phenomena	of	
very	high	 level	of	 complexity	 such	as	aporophobia.	Figure	4	presents	 the	main	 informational	
spaces	 involved	 in	most	micro	 aporophobia	 phenomena.	 A	more	 detailed	 account	 with	 the	
different	kinds	of	aporophobia	can	be	seen	on	Figure	5.		
	
Figure	4	–	The	3A	Micro	Measurement	Model	of	aporophobia:	info	spaces	
	
	
Source:	Authors’	creation.	
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Figure	5	–	The	3A	Micro	Measurement	Model	of	aporophobia	
	
	
Source:	Authors’	creation.	
	
It	 is	still	early	days	to	know	whether	these	kinds	of	micro	or	 individual	aporophobia	can	fit	a	
psychometric	 circumplex	 model	 that	 assumes	 very	 unique	 and	 highly	 specific	 patterns	 of	
intercorrelations.	 It	 might	 well	 be	 that	 some	 of	 these	 variables	 cannot	 be	 represented	 as	
located	along	the	perimeter	of	a	circle,	 following	certain	specification	of	the	angles	(that	can	
identify	which	variables	are	orthogonal	(uncorrelated)	to	each	other).	At	the	moment,	there	is	
no	available	evidence	to	predict	how	different	kinds	of	aporophobia	can	empirically	constitute	
such	a	model.	But	the	above	suggestion	constitutes	an	important	first	step	in	this	direction.		
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4.2	A	macro	dimension	empirical	illustration	
Altogether,	micro,	meso	and	macro	dimensions	constitute	different	aspects	of	aporophobia.	As	
discussed	 above,	 the	 micro	 dimension	 include	 IBAC	 and	 h-processes.	 They	 are	 about	 what	
people	feel,	believe	and	do.	The	meso	dimension	comprises	what	 institutions	do	(in	terms	of	
their	 principles,	 protocols	 and	 functionings).	 The	 macro	 dimension	 focused	 on	 how	 unjust	
economic	and	governmental	structures	produce	privileges	 for	 the	rich	and	governments	that	
do	not	care	for	the	welfare	of	the	poor	through	their	fiscal	policy,	generating	more	poverty	and	
inequality	(as	 illustrated	by	the	API	triangle).	As	such,	the	macro	dimension	constitutes	a	key	
aspect	of	aporophobia	that	is	at	the	same	time	intrinsically	and	instrumentally	important.	It	is	
intrinsically	 important	 because	 it	 represents	 a	 collective	 dimension	 of	 aporophobia	
incorporated	 into	 economic,	 societal	 and	 governmental	 structures;	 it	 is	 instrumentally	
important	 because	 it	 also	 works	 as	 a	 factory	 of	 enabling	 factors	 for	 the	 meso	 and	 micro	
dimensions	of	aporophobia.	
Each	dimension	of	aporophobia	addresses	phenomena	whose	empirical	nature	is	distinct.	The	
micro	 dimension	 refers	 to	 psychological	 phenomena	 that	 are	 difficult	 to	 observe	 and	 to	
measure	 and	 that	 need	 to	 be	 framed	 into	 formal	 psychometrics	 models.	 The	 elements	
presented	 in	 this	 paper	 should	 facilitate	 this	 work	 by	 theoretically	 organising	 the	 main	
components	 of	 individual	 aporophobia.	 On	 its	 turn,	 the	 meso	 dimension	 tackles	 empirical	
evidence	that	can	be	mostly	observed	in	schools,	hospitals,	shops,	firms,	etc	and	that	depend	
on	how	 institutions	 (formal	 or	 informal)	 are	 structured	 around	 (legal	 and	 ethical)	 principles,	
norms	and	codes	of	conduct.	Not	much	has	been	said	here	about	the	empirical	nature	of	this	
dimension	of	aporophobia	 that	can	be	 investigated	with	 the	use	of	surveys	and	 focal	groups	
about	the	workings	of	different	institutions.	Finally,	the	macro	dimension	focuses	on	empirical	
phenomena	 that	 only	 recently	 have	 received	 more	 systematic	 attention	 from	 scholars	 and	
international	 institutions,	 such	 as	 the	 degree	 of	 progressiveness	 in	 public	 spending	 and	 tax	
systems	and	the	share	of	the	10%	richest	of	their	national	 income	(Piketty,	2020).	It	 is	within	
this	 context	 that	 we	 can	 ask	 whether	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 characterise	 not	 only	 individuals	 but	
entire	countries	as	aporophobic?		
If	so,	what	are	the	main	empirical	features	of	aporophobic	countries?	The	main	mechanism	for	
generating	aporophobia	at	a	macro	level	is	represented	by	Figure	6	that	puts	forward	the	basis	
for	 an	 new	 index,	 introduced	 here,	 as	 the	 Global	 Aporophobia	 Index	 (GAI).	 The	 storylines	
behind	the	indicator	are	simple.	In	aporophobic	countries	the	non-poor	have	a	strong	capacity	
to	appropriate	a	large	share	of	the	national	income.	In	addition,	they	are	not	much	solidary	to	
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the	 poor	 and	 are	 very	 tolerant	 to	 inequality.	 Moreover,	 governments	 reinforce	 these	
inequalities	with	their	regressive	fiscal	policies.	Alternatively,	in	non-aporophobic	countries	the	
non-poor	 do	 not	 appropriate	 a	 large	 share	 of	 the	 national	 income	 and	 seem	 to	 be	 more	
generous	 to	 distribute	 to	 the	 poor	 the	 fruits	 of	 their	 income.	 Likewise,	 their	 governments	
reduce	 these	 primary	 inequalities	 with	 their	 progressive	 fiscal	 policies.	 Between	 these	 two	
extreme	storylines	we	find	the	realities	of	most	societies.	
Now,	not	all	variables	have	to	harmonically	move	in	the	same	direction.	It	might	well	be	that	
governments	 of	 different	 ideologies	 try	 to	 implement	 progressive	 fiscal	 policies	 in	 countries	
where	the	social	and	economic	structures	are	aporophobic,	generating	tensions	and	divergent	
trends.	Or	vice	versa.	The	important	point	however	is	that	the	GAI	provides	a	simple	storyline	
to	characterise	 the	presence	or	absence	of	aporophobia.	Following	the	Human	Development	
Index	methodology	(HDR,	2010),	it	tries	to	be	i)	simple,	with	few	dimensions	and	variables,	ii)	
easy	 to	 communicate,	 iii)	 multidimensional,	 normalising	 the	 variables	 in	 order	 to	 aggregate	
them	and	iv)	without	thresholds,	using	rankings	in	order	to	promote	analytical	inferences.	
	
Figure	6	–	Methodological	structure	of	the	Global	Aporophobia	Index	
	
Source:	Authors’	creation.	
	
The	 composite	 index	 consists	 of	 two	 simple	 sub-dimensions:	 ‘the	 economic	 sub-dimension’,	
representing	 the	 social	 forces	 that	 reject	 the	poor	 as	part	 of	 national	 distributional	 conflicts	
and	 the	 ‘governmental	 sub-dimension’	 that	 can	 also	 be	 seen	 as	 rejecting	 the	 poor	 if	 not	
offering	 them	 a	 good	 deal	 in	 redistributing	 income.	 Thus,	 the	 logic	 of	 distribution-
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redistribution	offers	 a	 simple	 structure	 for	 the	GAI.	Within	 each	dimension	we	 can	 find	 two	
variables.	The	first	variable	of	the	economic	sub-dimension	is	a	measure	of	the	capacity	of	the	
richest	groups	 to	appropriate	a	 larger	share	of	 their	national	 income.	The	 index	was	built	by	
using	the	share	of	the	10%	richest	but	any	other	threshold	could	have	been	used,	given	that	
the	aim	is	to	address	the	privileges	of	the	non-poor	as	an	outcome	of	aporophobic	societies.	
The	point	is	about	how	economic	systems	can	be	aporophobic	or	aporophilic.	This	is	not	simply	
about	 pro-poor	 growth	 and	 social	 inclusion.	 Growth	 can	 be	 pro-poor	 in	 aporophobic	
economies	where	the	rich	(in	a	given	country)	still	benefit	from	a	more	than	proportional	share	
of	 national	 income,	when	 compared	 to	 the	 rich	of	 other	 countries.	Growth	 can	be	pro-poor	
during	a	certain	period	and	then	revert	for	another	period.	
The	 second	 sub-dimension	of	 the	GAI	 is	 centred	on	 the	 role	of	 governments	 that	might	use	
their	fiscal	policies	(public	spending	and	taxation)	to	bridge	or	to	enlarge	the	distance	between	
the	poor	and	the	non-poor.	The	concept	of	 ‘progressiveness’	 is	central	for	understanding	the	
commitment	 that	 governments	 might	 have	 with	 different	 social	 groups,	 regardless	 of	 the	
income	 level	of	society	and	of	 the	governments’	capacity	 to	raise	resources.	 If	 the	degree	of	
progressiveness	in	spending	and	taxation	is	high,	this	means	that	the	level	of	commitment	to	
the	poor	 is	high.	 In	other	words,	governments	ensure	that	 the	burden	should	not	 fall	on	the	
poor.		
If	 the	degree	of	progressiveness	 in	spending	and	taxation	 is	 low,	this	means	that	the	 level	of	
commitment	 to	 the	poor	 is	 low,	 characterising	an	unjust	 situation	of	macro	aporophobia,	 in	
which	the	fiscal	burden	falls	on	the	poor.	Several	of	the	variables	mentioned	above	are	already	
produced	 by	 international	 organisations.	 For	 this	 reason,	 it	 is	 more	 efficient	 to	 use	 this	
compiled	 secondary	 data	 rather	 than	 try	 to	 produce	 (and	 redefine)	 variables	 from	 national	
data.	Some	other	variables,	that	do	not	enter	directly	 into	the	making	of	the	 index,	are	used	
for	analytical	purposes.	They	all	come	from	well-known	 institutions	such	as	Oxfam,	DFI,	CAF,	
World	Bank	and	UNDP.	Table	4	specifies	the	main	variables	used	for	the	creation	of	GAI:	
	
	
	
	
	
22	
	
Table	4	–	Description	of	GAI	variables	
Variables	 Description	
Richest’s	capacity	of	appropriation	 Income	 share	 held	 by	 highest	 10%.	 Source:	
World	Bank,	2019	
Social	private	redistribution	 Composite	 index	 that	 takes	 into	 account	 i)	
donation	 of	 money	 to	 a	 charity,	 ii)	 time	
volunteered	to	an	organisation	and	ii)	help	to	
a	 stranger.	 Source:	 Charities	 Aid	 Foundation,	
2019	
Degree	of	progressivity	of	spending	 Composite	 index	 that	 takes	 into	 account	
social	 spending	 as	 %	 of	 total	 spending	 and	
incidence	 of	 spending	 on	 inequality.	 Source:	
DFI	and	Oxfam,	2018	
Degree	of	progressivity	of	tax	 Composite	 index	 that	 considers	 progressivity	
of	 tax	 structure,	 incidence	 of	 tax	 on	
inequality,	 tax	 collection	 and	 harmful	 tax	
practices.	Source:	DFI	and	Oxfam,	2018	
Note:	Some	composite	indicators	use	data	from	different	years.	Data	refers	to	the	most	recent	
years	available.	
	
All	the	scales	have	been	harmonised	to	produce	an	index	that	starts	at	0	(suggesting	no	macro	
aporophobia)	 and	 ends	 at	 1	 (suggesting	 maximum	 macro	 aporophobia).	 Initial	 calculations	
were	 produced	 for	 155	 countries.	 Some	 examples	 might	 be	 useful	 to	 characterise	 these	
processes.	When	we	look	at	countries	with	very	high	levels	of	aporophobia,	we	find	that	at	the	
top	of	the	list	there	are	many	small	countries	with	incipient	spending	and	tax	structures,	where	
the	 rich	 appropriate	 a	 very	 high	 proportion	 of	 their	 national	 income.	 The	 situation	 of	 these	
countries	seem	to	be	a	bit	peculiar,	given	that	some	are	fiscal	paradises	and	others	have	their	
economies	 dominated	 by	 few	 economic	 activities	 (many	 are	 islands	with	 small	 populations)	
and	for	this	reason	we	moved	towards	a	shorter	list	of	127	countries	with	populations	above	
1.5	million.		
One	 limitation	 in	 using	 this	 kind	 of	 international	 data	 is	 that	 not	 all	 of	 the	 above	 data	 is	
available	for	the	most	recent	years.	Thus,	we	should	consider	that	whereas	most	countries	will	
have	figures	for	2018,	others	might	have	only	for	2015	or	2012.	Be	it	as	it	may,	this	follows	the	
protocols	 followed	 by	 the	 international	 organisations	 mentioned	 in	 Table	 4.	 Some	 basic	
stylised	facts	emerge	from	a	simple	grouping	and	classification	of	countries.		
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Table	5	-	GAI	Summary	Statistics	by	subgroup	
Sample	 Mean	GAI	 Std.	Dev.	 Min	GAI	 Max	GAI	
All	 .5194921	 .1379008	 .1703766	 .7766051	
By	HDI	Level	
Very	High	 .4021047	 .1519143	 .1703766	 .7322341	
High	 .5546188	 .0665013	 .4504590	 .7035868	
Medium	 .5561391	 .0741815	 .4038277	 .7072566	
Low	 .6231511	 .0797195	 .4906985	 .7766051	
Income	Group	
High	 .4471006	 .1543346	 .1703766	 .7322341	
Upper-Middle	 .5461468	 .0639826	 .4125498	 .6731802	
Lower-Middle	 .6038172	 .0791610	 .4729448	 .7517365	
Low	 .6687723	 .0826599	 .5660041	 .7766051	
Inequality	
Very	High	 .6198746	 .1122853	 .3464427	 .7766051	
High	 .5779979	 .0955561	 .2626553	 .7517365	
Medium	 .4868589	 .1281209	 .1703766	 .7235230	
Low	 .4014900	 .1434562	 .1831173	 .6007898	
Expected	Years	of	Education	
Less	 than	
primary	
.6255447	 .	 .6255447	 .6255447	
Primary	 .6038667	 .0882769	 .4977631	 .7766051	
Middle	School	 .6052694	 .0793849	 .4364705	 .744146	
Secondary		 .5447921	 .0819978	 .4018423	 .7517365	
College		 .3502664	 .1470354	 .1703766	 .7066514	
Average	Years	of	Education	
Less	 than	
primary	
.6195774	 .0809483	 .4364705	 .7766051	
Primary	 .5634977	 .0651734	 .4125498	 .7332887	
Middle	School	 .5136191	 .1071141	 .2430909	 .7322341	
Secondary	 .3528538	 .1436968	 .1703766	 .6342195	
Notes:	1.	HDI	and	Income	Group	Categories	as	defined	by	the	UNDP	and	World	Bank,	
respectively.		2.	Inequality	Subgroups	are	defined	using	the	Gini	values	(Very	High	>50;	High	
40-50;	Medium	30-40;	Low	<30.		
Source:	Author’s	calculation	using	UNDP	(2019),	World	Bank	(2019).		
	
These	summary	statistics	are	useful	to	provide	an	idea	of	how	the	index	changes	according	to	
key	development	parameters	such	as	the	HDI,	income	and	inequality	levels,	expected	years	and	
average	years	of	education.	It	suggests	that	macro	aporophobia	is	lower	in	those	societies	that	
are	more	developed,	 richer,	more	equal	 and	more	educated.	 In	order	 to	determine	whether	
these	differences	were	statistically	significant,	a	series	of	one-way	analysis	of	variance	(ANOVA)	
tests	were	conducted	for	each	of	the	subgroup	decompositions	as	reported	in	Table	6.		
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Table	6	-	One-Way	Analysis	of	Variance	of	GAI	by	subgroups	
Source	 SS	 DF	 MS	 F	
HDI	 .98	 3	 .33	 28.59***	
Income	 .67	 3	 .22	 15.92***	
Inequality	 .63	 3	 .21	 14.60***	
EYS	 1.16	 4	 .30	 28.81***	
AYS	 1.14	 3	 .38	 37.04***	
Total		 2.40	 126	 .019	 	
Notes:		***,	**,*	indicate	significance	at	1%,	5%,	and	10%	confidence	levels,	respectively.	EYS:	
expected	years	of	schooling	and	AYS:	average	years	of	schooling	
Source:	Authors’	calculation	
	
The	results	of	the	ANOVA	reveal	that	the	differences	in	GAI	between	the	various	subgroups	are	
indeed	 statistically	 significant.	 These	 results	 are	 further	 verified	 through	 Tukey's	 HSD	 tests,	
shown	 in	 Table	 7,	 which	 compare	 all	 possible	 pairs	 of	 means	 between	 subgroups	 and	 are	
usually	used	in	conjunction,	as	post	hoc	tests,	with	the	one-way	ANOVA.	(Tabachnick	&	Fidell,	
2007).			
	
Table	7	-	Summary	of	Tukey	HSD	Post-Hoc	Analyses	
Pairwise	Comparisons	 Contrast	 Std.	Err.	 T	
HDI	
Very	High	vs	Low	 -.2210464	 .0254844	 -8.67***	
Very	High	vs	Medium	 -.1540343	 .0263052	 -5.86***	
Very	High	vs	High	 -.1525141	 .0263052	 -5.80***	
High	vs	Low	 -.0685323	 .0284186	 -2.41	
Medium	vs	Low	 -.0670121	 .0284186	 -2.36	
High	vs	Medium	 -.0015202	 .0291569	 -0.05	
Income	
High	vs	Low	 -.2216716	 .0551742	 -4.02***	
High	vs	Lower-middle	 -.1567166	 .0260062	 -6.03***	
Upper-middle	vs	Low	 -.1226255	 .0570877	 -2.15	
High	vs	Upper-middle	 -.0990461	 .0262767	 -3.77***	
Lower-middle	vs	Low	 -.0649551	 .0569637	 -1.14	
Upper-middle	vs	Lower-middle	 -.0576704	 .0298519	 -1.93	
Inequality	
Very	High	vs	High	 .0418767	 .0344443	 1.22	
Medium	vs	Low	 .0853689	 .0320498	 2.66**	
High	vs	Medium	 .0911389	 .0256777	 3.55***	
Very	High	vs	Medium	 .1330156	 .0326985	 4.07***	
High	vs	Low	 .1765078	 .033829	 5.22***	
Very	High	vs	Low	 .2183845	 .039424	 5.54***	
Expected	Years	of	Schooling	
College	vs	Less	than	primary	 -.2752783	 .1022168	 -2.69*	
College	vs	Middle	 -.2550029	 .0259631	 -9.82***	
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College	vs	Primary	 -.2536002	 .0401345	 -6.32***	
College	vs	Secondary	 -.1945257	 .0228564	 -8.51***	
Secondary	vs	Less	than	primary	 -.0807526	 .1013614	 -0.80	
Secondary	vs	Middle	 -.0604772	 .0223594	 -2.70*	
Secondary	vs	Primary	 -.0590745	 .037903	 -1.56	
Primary	vs	Less	than	primary	 -.021678	 .106595	 -0.20	
Middle	vs	Less	than	primary	 -.0202754	 .1021068	 -0.20	
Middle	vs	Primary	 .0014027	 .0398536	 0.04	
Average	Years	of	Schooling	
Secondary	vs	Less	than	primary	 -.2667236	 .0264359	 -10.09***	
Secondary	vs	Primary	 -.2106439	 .0260776	 -8.08***	
Secondary	vs	Middle	 -.1607653	 .0260776	 -6.16***	
Middle	vs	Less	than	primary	 -.1059583	 .0249162	 -4.25***	
Primary	vs	Less	than	primary	 -.0560797	 .0249162	 -2.25	
Middle	vs	Primary	 -.0498786	 .0245358	 -2.03	
Notes:	***,	**,*	indicate	significance	at	1%,	5%,	and	10%	confidence	levels,	respectively.	
Source:	Authors’	calculation	
	
The	 results	 indicate	 that	 the	 differences	 in	 GAI	 between	 HDI	 categories,	 Income	 groups,	
Inequality	classifications,	and	educational	attainment	levels,	are	all	statistically	significant	at	a	
1%	confidence	level.	However,	the	Tukey	post-hoc	tests	revealed	that	there	were	statistically	
significant	differences	for	several,	but	not	all,	of	the	pairwise	comparisons	between	subgroups.	
This	evidence	suggests	 that	 low	human	development	countries	have	 the	highest	 level	of	GAI	
and	 that	 it	 decreases	 as	 we	 move	 towards	 countries	 with	 a	 higher	 level	 of	 human	
development.	But	this	is	not	a	linear	process.	Much	of	this	difference	can	be	found	in	relation	
to	 very	 high	 human	 development	 countries	 in	 comparison	 to	 high,	 medium	 and	 low	
development	 countries,	 but	 not	 among	 these	 lower	 groups,	 indicating	 that	 only	 at	 higher	
levels	of	human	development	is	that	societies	manage	to	overcome	their	macro	aporophobia.	
This	 happens	 because	we	 find	 in	 very	 high	 human	development	 countries	more	 progressive	
spending	and	progressive	taxes,	higher	giving	capacity	and	lower	share	of	the	10%	richest.		
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Figure	7	–	GAI	vs	HDI	
	
Notes:	 calculated	 for	 127	 countries	 with	 populations	 above	 1.5	 million	 people.	 Whenever	
available	data	was	used	for	2018.	
Source:	Authors’	calculation	using	UNDP	(2019),	World	Bank	(2019),	Charities	Aid	Foundation	
(2019),	and	DFI	&	Oxfam	(2018).		
	
	
We	 find	 that	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	 list	 is	 the	 Central	 African	 Republic,	with	 a	 GAI	 of	 0.777.	 The	
degree	 of	 progressiveness	 of	 their	 spending	 and	 tax	 system	 is	 very	 low,	 0.12	 and	 0.22	
respectively.	 Their	 giving	 index	 is	 lower	 than	 the	 respective	 index	 in	 less	 aporophobic	
countries.	The	income	share	of	the	10%	richest	is	46.2%.	Compare	it	with	Panama,	with	a	GAI	
of	0.672.	Its	degree	of	progressiveness	of	their	spending	is	very	similar,	0.11	but	the	degree	of	
progressiveness	of	taxes	is	higher	at	0.35.	With	a	similar	giving	index	of	35,	the	income	share	of	
the	10%	richest	is	39.3%,	what	explains	its	position.		
At	the	other	extreme,	less	aporophobic	countries	such	as	Germany	and	Australia,	have	a	very	
high	level	of	progressiveness	of	their	public	spending,	0.71	and	0.56	respectively,	followed	by	
even	higher	progressiveness	of	taxes	of	0.88	and	1.0.	Their	levels	of	giving	are	also	higher,	43	
and	56	respectively	as	well	as	the	income	share	of	the	10%	richest	that	are	much	lower,	24.9	
and	26.5,	 respectively.	 The	picture	 that	 emerges	 from	 these	 figures	 corroborates	 the	 simple	
storylines	that	are	suggested	above.		
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Income	seems	to	be	relevant	for	this	analysis	between	high	and	low,	lower-middle	and	upper-
middle	 countries	 but	 not	 among	 them	 suggesting	 that	 the	 transition	 from	 low	 income	
countries	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 associated	 with	 lower	 levels	 of	macro	 aporophobia.	 On	 the	
other	hand,	macro	aporophobia	seems	to	be	very	sensitive	to	inequality,	but	in	this	case,	the	
only	 difference	 that	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 statistically	 significant	 is	 between	 those	with	 very	
high	and	high	 inequality,	 suggesting	 that	after	 a	 certain	 inequality	 threshold,	 aporophobia	 is	
more	 of	 a	 problem.	 When	 we	 consider	 the	 education	 flow,	 given	 by	 expected	 years	 of	
schooling,	the	differences	between	college	and	other	degrees	is	remarkable,	although	there	is	
also	 a	 difference	 between	 secondary	 and	 middle	 to	 report.	 Finally,	 when	 we	 consider	 the	
education	stock,	the	average	years	of	schooling	of	those	above	25	years,	we	see	that	only	at	
lower	levels	we	do	not	find	any	significant	difference.	
	
5.	Conclusion	
Cortina	 (2017)	 has	 named	 and	 conceptualised	 a	 phenomenon	 that	 is	 at	 the	 root	 of	 several	
challenges	in	promoting	human	development:	aporophobia.	The	importance	of	this	construct	
cannot	be	overestimated.	Not	only	does	the	concept	of	aporophobia	tackle	a	very	 important	
kind	of	discrimination	but	 it	also	addresses	 issues	 that	can	change	 the	way	 that	poverty	and	
inequality	are	considered	as	separate	phenomena.	It	is	within	this	context	that	this	paper	has	
put	 forward	 a	 new	 framework	 for	 examining	 and	 measuring	 the	 different	 dimensions	 of	
aporophobia,	namely,	the	micro,	meso,	and	macro	dimensions,	each	with	their	own	generating	
processes.	 Some	of	 these	processes	 are	psychological;	 some	are	 institutional	 and	others	 are	
part	 of	 economic,	 cultural	 and	 governmental	 structures	 that	 define	 the	 ways	 that	 societies	
work	against	the	poor.	
Within	the	micro	or	psychological	domain,	 IBAC	and	h-processes	unveil	some	complexities	 in	
explaining	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 aporophobia	 phenomena.	 This	 paper	 raises	 several	 conceptual	
issues	 that	might	 inform	empirical	 agendas	 related	 to	 the	 formation	of	 aporophobia	beliefs,	
how	 are	 they	 consolidated	 in	 attitudes	 and	 under	 what	 conditions	 they	 can	 trigger	
aporophobic	actions,	or	ultimately,	aporophobic	 crime.	This	analytical	 sequence	 is	 static	and	
can	be	complemented	by	work	that	maps	out	dynamic	aporophobia	trajectories.	Future	results	
in	 this	 field	 might	 help	 the	 development	 of	 anti-aporophobia	 policies,	 with	 targeted	
interventions	 directed	 at	 families,	 children,	 adolescents,	 etc	 on	 sensitive	 and	 critical	 periods	
(that	 is,	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 timing	when	 individuals	 are	more	exposed	 to	 aporophophic	
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psychological	phenomena).	Much	can	be	learned	here	from	studies	that	examine	other	forms	
of	phobia	and	discrimination.	But	aporophobia	idiosyncrasies	should	not	be	ignored.	
Within	 the	 meso	 or	 institutional	 domain	 of	 aporophobia,	 new	 light	 can	 be	 thrown	 on	 the	
debate	about	governance	structures	and	codes	of	conduct	of	institutions,	in	particular,	but	not	
only,	 of	 public	 institutions.	Whenever	 the	 poor	 is	 rejected	 by	 the	 way	 that	 institutions	 are	
organised,	there	is	a	case	of	meso	aporophobia.	This	can	be	the	case	of	how	hospitals	allocate	
shorter	than	necessary	appointment	times	for	poor	(because	poor	patients	might	need	more	
time	to	understand	what	their	doctors	are	saying)	or	when	schools	do	not	train	their	teachers	
to	tackle	specific	difficulties	of	students	 in	poor	communities	or	when	companies	have	 loose	
protocols	 for	hiring	new	personnel	or	promoting	their	employees	that	allow	applicants	to	be	
discriminated	for	the	simple	reason	of	being	poor.	
Finally,	 within	 the	 macro	 dimension	 this	 discussion	 focuses	 on	 the	 role	 of	 the	 non-poor	 in	
benefiting	from	unjust	aporophobic	structures	without	showing	much	sympathy	for	the	poor.	
And	how	governments,	 instead	of	balancing	out	these	effects,	reinforce	them	through	unjust	
spending	 and	 tax	 structures	 that	 allocate	 a	 heavier	 burden	 to	 the	 poor.	 This	 discussion	
suggests	 that	 progressiveness	 is	 key	 for	 making	 countries	 less	 aporophobic.	 But	 it	 is	 not	
enough.	 It	 is	 also	 important	 to	 discuss	 why	 in	 some	 countries	 the	 rich	 appropriate	 a	much	
larger	share	of	the	national	income	than	the	rich	in	other	countries.	It	is	also	important	to	talk	
about	how	some	non-rich	do	not	sympathise	enough	with	the	poor.			
This	paper	puts	forward	two	illustrations	of	this	proposed	framework:	one	conceptual	and	one	
empirical,	with	the	creation	of	the	Global	Aporophobia	Index.	But	much	more	needs	to	be	said	
about	aporophobia.	This	is	an	emerging	field	and	we	expect	that	in	the	forthcoming	years	new	
theories	 and	 empirical	 evidence	will	 illuminate	 some	 of	 the	 issues	 raised	 by	 Cortina	 (2017).	
Some	of	these	issues	will	be	about	the	psychology	of	aporophobia.	Others	will	be	about	how	
institutions	 are	 prepared	 (or	 not)	 to	 handle	 different	 kinds	 of	 rejection	 of	 the	 poor	 as	 a	
category	 of	 discrimination.	 Finally,	 another	 set	 of	 issues	 will	 delve	 into	 the	 links	 between	
poverty	and	inequality,	broadening	the	scope	of	the	debate	to	take	into	account	the	role	of	the	
non-poor	in	tolerating	and	sometimes	even	benefiting	from	unjust	forms	of	inequality.	Overall,	
new	empirical	 evidence	 can	 inform	and	 shape	new	public	policies	 and	private	 interventions,	
addressing	a	range	of	problems	that	have	been	ignored	by	so	long.	
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